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Abstract 
This Master dissertation has as main objective to analyze the level of Dividends paid 
by road PPP’s in Portugal, by comparing the level of Dividends paid in percentage of the 
Net Profit in road PPP’s and the main Portuguese and Spanish construction companies. 
This study is justified by the fact that PPP’s are constituted by only one project, and 
consequently they do not present a significant need to reinvest. Then, it is relevant to 
investigate if the treatment of Net Profits is similar to the one made to common companies 
(in this case, large Portuguese and Spanish construction companies), in which there is 
need of reinvestment because the companies are involved in many projects or in a project 
that does not present a limited period of time. The question of this dissertation is then the 
following: the PPP’s in analysis distribute a higher level of Dividends in percentage of 
Net Profits than the construction companies in analysis? In order to provide a response to 
this question it was collected data, and then it was made a statistical analysis of the data. 
The sample is constituted by 12 PPP’s and 7 construction companies. The conclusion 
reached is that road PPP’s have a policy of dividends distribution stronger and more 
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Esta dissertação tem como objectivo analisar o nível de Dividendos pagos pelas PPP’s 
rodoviárias em Portugal, comparando o nível de dividendos pagos em percentagem do 
Resultado Líquido das PPP’s rodoviárias e das principais empresas de construção 
Portuguesas e Espanholas. Este estudo justifica-se pelo facto de as PPP’s serem 
constituídas por um único projecto, e consequentemente não apresentarem necessidade 
significativa de reinvestir, pelo que é pertinente averiguar se o tratamento dos Resultados 
Líquidos é semelhante ao das empresas com características vulgares (neste caso grandes 
empresas de construção Portuguesas e Espanholas), em que existe necessidade de 
reinvestimento por não estarem associadas a um único projecto com um período de tempo 
limitado. Coloca-se a seguinte questão: as PPP’s em análise distribuem um maior nível 
de Dividendos em percentagem do Resultado Líquido do que as empresas de construção 
em análise? Para responder a esta questão, foi efetuada a recolha de dados, seguida da 
análise estatística dos mesmos. A amostra é constituída por 12 PPP’s e 7 empresas de 
construção. A conclusão que foi possível obter é que as PPP’s rodoviárias têm uma 
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Chapter 1 -Introduction 
In finance there are 3 main decisions that firms have to consider: financing, investment 
and dividends distribution (Damodaram, 2001). Putting the focus on dividends 
distribution, a pertinent and present question is to know if policy dividends is similar in 
Corporate Finance and in Project Finance (for example, PPP’s). Presently, Public Private 
Partnerships (PPP’s) as an alternative to traditional procurement of public services is 
more and more common. Portugal is not an exception to this trend. Like the other 
countries, it is motivated by the budget restrictions and need to offer public goods/ 
services with quality. 
The objective of this dissertation is to make a comparison of dividend pay-out between 
two groups of companies: 
1. The road PPP’s in Portugal (Project Finance); 
2. Portuguese and Spanish listed companies in the sector of construction (Corporate 
Finance). 
The time period considered in the analysis includes years between 2003 and 2011.  
According to the Literature Review, the hypothesis of study that was formulated is the 
following: 
Dividend payout ratio is higher to the Road PPP’s. 
On one hand, there is the payments of dividends made by firms that work in the basis of 
Project Finance (and consequently do not allow reinvestment, because of the scope of 
their project. It is the case of PPP’s.) On the other hand, “market companies”, subject to 
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the need of reinvestments (firms that have many ways to use the net profits generated in 
each year, issue that, in theory, reduces the distribution of dividends). The difference in 
the type of company brings the reason of this comparison and the goal to conclude what 
kind of these firms present a higher dividend pay-out ratio. 
The choice of road PPP’s, instead of PPP’s in other sector, is based on the large 
percentage that road PPP’s occupy in total PPP’s in Portugal: three quarters of the budget 
effort on PPP’s in Portugal is to road PPP’s (Sarmento & Reis, 2013). The choice of the 
construction firms was motivated by the fact that the construction sector and road PPP’s 
have some common characteristics. Construction firms usually have capital participation 
in road PPP’s. 
The first stage of the work consisted in collect the data: Dividends, Net Profits, Revenues, 
Dividends of Minority Interests, Dividends in the form of previous years Reserves, 
Acquisition of Own Shares, Anticipated Dividends, Net Profit to Shareholders and Net 
Profit to Minority Interests of all the companies in analysis, in the years between 2003 
and 2011. After the data was collected, statistical analysis were made about the proportion 
of Dividends in Net Profit to the companies at the years referred previously, in the form 
of descriptive statistics and graphs.  
The main conclusion reached was that Dividend Payout ratio in PPP’s is higher than in 
construction companies. 
In Chapter 2, it will be presented the Literature Review, where the main facts about PPP’s, 
Project Finance versus Corporate Finance, and Dividend Payout are presented. In Chapter 
3, the Methodology and Data used are presented. In Chapter 4, it is presented the 
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Portuguese Case of PPP’s, with some important facts about the importance of PPP’s in 
Portugal. In Chapter 5, Statistical Results are presented, in the form of Statistical Tables 
and their interpretation. In Chapter 6, it is presented the Results, in the form of figures 
that shows in an easy way the Results reached. Finally, in Chapter 7, the Conclusion and 
suggestions to future research are presented.   
 
 
Chapter 2- Literature Review 
2.1 Definition of PPP 
PPP´s were introduced in early 1990’s (OECD, 2008). It is difficult to find a universal 
definition of PPP, as the definition is not well established (Greve & Hodge, 2010). OECD 
(2008) defines PPP’s as an agreement in which the objective of an efficient delivery of 
the service is aligned with the profit objective of the private entity. The quality of the 
alignment depends on a correct risk sharing between the parties. According to Santos 
(2006), PPP’s are the result of two needs: the public sector has to provide better services 
and, on the other hand, it has several budget limitations. According to European Bank of 
Investment (2004), PPP’s are “relationships formed between the private sector and public 
bodies often with the aim of introducing private sector resources and/or expertise in order 
to help provide and deliver public sector assets and services” (EIB, 2004). European 
Commission defined PPP’s as “the transference of investment projects that have been 
traditionally executed or funded by the public sector to the private sector” (European 
Commission, 2003).  
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PPP’s are different from privatization, outsourcing or public traditional procurement. 
Privatization exists when a public company is bought by a private entity; outsourcing 
consists in to hire a private company to provide some specific service that constitutes an 
activity; public traditional procurement is defined by the total responsibility of the 
Government in the project. The decision on which a service should be provided by the 
mean of a PPP is based on three questions: if it is, or not, a service that government should 
provide to the citizens, if the PPP is the model that delivers the best Value for Money  
(VFM) and if the model satisfies the public interest (Grimsey & Lewis, 2004). 
Santos (2006) considers that a PPP project has 3 main characteristics: 1) there is a contract 
between a public entity and a private entity; 2) the risk should be allocated to the more 
capable entity to manage it and 3) the private entity, in addition to fund the project, 
participates in the management. In a PPP, the private entity is usually responsible for the 
management, financing, design, construction and operation (Akintoye, 2009). Ham & 
Koppenjan (2001) consider that PPP’s are contracts where risks, costs and resources are 
shared between the two parts.  A significant part of the risk of PPP’s is related with the 
complexity of the arrangement in terms of documentation, financing, taxation, sub 
agreements and technical details. According to Browne (2003), the factors that permits 
growth in PPP’s are efficiency (reducing duplication achieves a better use of resources), 
integration and accountability. This fact has been defended for a long time by many 
authors. PPP’s permits to the services provided by Government to achieve larger markets 
(Browne, 2003). 
According to PricewaterhouseCoopers (2004), the sectors where PPP’s are more frequent 
in Europe are road sector, rail sector and water sector. According to Santos (2006), there 
are still other types of PPP’s: wealth, security, energy, port sector, technology and prisons. 
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Public Private Partnerships are expressed in the Portuguese Law. PPP definition can be 
read on article 2º of the Decree Law number 86/2003 (date of 26th April), and at the 
Decree-Law number 141/2006 (27th July). According to article 2nd of Decree Law 
86/2003, PPP is a contract or a union of contracts, in which private entities are obliged to 
a public partner, in a lasting period of time, to ensure the development of a project that 
will satisfy a collective need. The private partner is responsible for the financing, 
investment and exploitation (it can do that by itself or along with the public partner).  The 
risks are shared. Decree Law 86/2003 establishes the rules on the intervention on the 
Public estate on PPP’s.  
According to Akintoye (2003), the main types of PPP are: 
- Joint Venture: Public partner and private partner share all types of responsibilities 
and the public entity is the regulator.  
- Exploration concession of a public service: A private entity is hired to guarantee 
the providing of a public service. 
- Exploration concession of a public infrastructure: In this type of PPP, the private 
partner is responsible for the exploitation and maintenance of the infrastructure; 
In this case, private entity can define a price to finance this investment. 
- Privatization: Public entity sells a infrastructure to a private entity, without a 
defined temporal limit on the responsibility of the private entity to explore it. 
- “BOT” concessions: An infrastructure is created to satisfy a public need; a private 
entity constructs and explores it and it is its proprietary. However, in the end of 
the period of concession, the infrastructure becomes public.  
Boardman & Vining (1989) analyzed 54 studies about the performance of public sector 
and private entities, and concluded that most of them referred that the performance is 
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better on private entities. Bennett & Johnson (1979) and Borcherding et al (1982) 
concluded also that private performance is better than the public performance.  
PPP’s present advantages and disadvantages, the reason why they are applied and, on the 
other hand, criticized. One of the advantages of PPP’s is the economies of scale, which 
arises from the contract between the public sector and the private entity (Santos, 2006). 
This author refers also the celerity of the constructions of infra structures and 
implementation of projects, better quality of the service provided, better allocation of risk, 
additional revenues that can be the result of the surplus of supply. Some of the 
disadvantages cited by Santos (2006) are the possibility of an inadequate allocation of 
risks, the misuse of PPP’s and the need to monitor the PPP frequently because of its 
complexity. Another disadvantage of PPP’s is that the cost of funding in private projects 
is more expensive than the cost of funding that the Government supports on traditional 
procurement (Grimsey & Lewis, 2004). 
Now it is presented some findings about PPP’s that involve infrastructures. In a way 
concerning road PPP’s, Savas (2000) considers that PPP’s are an alternative way to build 
infrastructures. Grimsey & Lewis (2004) concluded that the construction of 
infrastructures requires the discipline of the private sector, in what concerns deadlines 
and budget. PPP’s that involve infrastructures involve a long term project (25 to 35 years). 
During this time the services associated with the infrastructure must be provided 
(Grimsey & Lewis, 2004). The World Bank in 1994 confirmed that the role of 
infrastructures in the growth is crucial. 
In terms of compliance, we have that PPP projects are supervised by public entities 
(“Direção Geral do Tesouro e Finanças” website). Article 2nd of Decree Law 86/2003 
expresses that to ensure the compliance with the contract, there exist instruments of 
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jurisdictional regulation. Despite of the supervision and advantages presented by PPP’s, 
they raise some controversy, for example on how to ensure accountability, cost 
effectiveness, transparency and efficiency (Akintoye, 2009). PPP’s allow for the absence 
of competitors, which can lead to unreasonable profits to the private sector with reduced 
benefits to the public sector (Akintoye, 2009). 
According to Akintoye (2009), the length of the period of the PPP contract is crucial to a 
sustainable project. If the concession period is too long, the return can get unreasonable. 
Browne (2003) concluded that PPP’s take long time to establish and to present results. At 
the end of the PPP period, the private party transfers the facility to the public sector 
(Grimsey & Lewis, 2004).  
2.2 PPP’s structure and characteristics 
PPP structure sometimes becomes too complex because of the many entities it involves, 
as public entity, private entity, funders, customers, suppliers etc. In order to decrease this 
problem, it can be created an independent commercial entity, designated Special Purpose 
Vehicle, SPV (Freitas, 2008). SPV’s are created specifically to one project, which implies 
a finite lifetime. All the contracts are negotiated between the SPV and the entities 
involved (UNESCAP, 2007). For example, SPV is responsible by the communication 
between the clients and the intervenient. In general, it is responsible by the project. The 
project sponsor creates a SPV to be responsible for the project and construct him (Slivker, 
2011). According to OECD (2008), SPV’s are usually composed by financial institutions 
and private entities.  
One of the characteristics of SPV is its low capitalization (low number of shareholders), 
which implies that there is a need of direct revenues to cover the costs (operating costs, 
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capital costs and debt provided), Grimsey & Lewis (2000). SPV’s are financed essentially 
by debt and are dependent on the financial flows of their only project (Akintoye, 2009). 
This leads to the fact that the level of debt in SPV’s is elevated. SPV’s are used in PPP 
projects to maintain the assets and liabilities of the project out of sponsors’ balance sheets 
(none of the sponsors owns more than 50% of the SPV shares) and avoid to the PPP 
project to be associated with possible bankruptcy of one of the sponsors (Grimsey & 
Lewis, 2004). According to Grimsey & Lewis (2004), PPP´s have a disadvantage 
comparing with traditional procurement: the contracting costs. 
Infrastructure investment in PPP’s is generally in the form of SPV (Grimsey & Lewis, 
2004). According to the same paper, generally large PPP’s involve SPV’s.  
2.3 A Comparison between Project Finance and Corporate Finance 
Project finance is a form of financing high risk projects (Comer, 1996). The objective of 
Project Finance is to divide risk between various shareholders, in projects where the 
required investment and the risks are too large (Borges, 2002). With project finance, the 
sponsors of the project don’t have to give extra capital to the project (Slivker, 2011). The 
question of reinvestment does not exist at Project Finance (there is a single project, and 
since the initial investment is finished, there is no need to new funds) and there is a fixed 
dividend policy with an immediate payout (Comer, 1996). This leads to an almost total 
distribution of net profit in the form of dividends. At Corporate Finance, the dividends 
policy is strictly controlled (Comer, 1996). At Project Finance, dividend policy is not so 
restricted.  
According to Borges (2002), Project Finance is maintained with the cash flows of a single 
project. According to him, the guarantee of these cash flows is the expected receipts 
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during the project. The guarantees to the lenders are the expected revenues of the project 
(Slivker, 2011). To sponsors of a project, Project finance is advantageous compared with 
corporate finance, since with project finance, the lender is not allowed to pursue the assets 
of the project in the case of default, because the guarantee does not include the assets 
(Slivker, 2011). Other advantage of Project Finance is the fact that the debt stays “out of 
the balance” of the sponsors because financing is made by the SPV and not by the 
sponsors. Another advantage is its high level of leverage, Azeredo (1999).  PPP’s are 
essentially project financing (Grimsey & Lewis, 2000; Slivker, 2011). At project finance, 
the entity responsible by the project is a SPV (Slivker, 2011). 
2.4 Dividend Payout in Finance 
Dividend payout ratio is a measure of the dividend strategy of a firm. It measures the 
percentage that dividends represent in Net Profit. The dividend payout ratio varies 
considerably among companies. The reasons for which companies decide their dividend 
payout ratio are numerous. Agency costs are one of these arguments. Lloyd et al (1985). 
Rozeff (1982) concluded that dividends can reduce the agency costs. Al-Malkawi (2005) 
found empirical evidence for this argument of agency costs (theory that dividends can 
reduce the agency costs) in a study made for companies of an emergent market named 
Amman Stock Exchange in the time period 1989-2000. 
The other arguments that influence companies’ dividend payout ratio are then presented. 
The effect that dividend payout policy has on firms is not linear. Many times companies 
take their decision on dividend payout ratio based on the effect that they expect to exist 
in company (in many variables) after the distribution of these dividends, Lloyd et al 
(1985).  
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One of the main theories about dividend payout ratio comes from  Modigliani & Miller 
(1961), who concluded that, assuming perfect markets exist (no taxes), dividend payout 
ratio has a null effect on firm value (and on shares valuation). This theory is commonly 
agreed. These authors refer also that in perfect capital markets, firms take their investment 
decisions irrespectively of the type of financing that the firm adopts. This implies that 
investment decisions should not be taken based on dividends distribution. Inversely, 
Dhrymes & Kurz (1967) referred that, under imperfect markets, dividends and 
investments compete for the use of internal funds because they are considered to be 
cheaper than the external ones. Consequently, they conclude that investment decisions 
are influenced by dividends distribution.  
McCabe (1979) also concluded that dividends, investment and financing (new debt) are 
interdependent, which means that managers decide about the level of investment and 
dividends according to the proportion of each other and according to the level of profits. 
Firms’ need for funds is also a variable that is influenced by dividend payout decision 
(Higgins, 1972), who has shown that there is a negative relationship between the 
variables. The higher the need for funds, the lower the dividends distributed. There are 
many authors that share this conclusion. This negative relationship is explained by Rozeff 
(1982) by the fact that high beta firms probably require costly external financing and 
consequently pays lower dividends in order to have funds to invest.  Fama (1974) 
concluded that investment has the expected negative effect on dividend in 60% of the 
cases and, on the other hand, that dividends have the expected negative effect in 
investment in 40% of the cases. When perfect markets do not exist, the effect of dividends 
in equity value is not clear (Higgins, 1972).  
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McCabe (1979) presented the conclusion that new long-term debt has a negative influence 
on the amount of dividends paid by firms. Dividends policy can also have effect on taxes. 
The conclusions about these effects are nonlinear. On one hand, Black & Scholes (1974) 
refer not to exist effect on taxes, while Litzenberger & Ramaswamy (1979) concluded 
that there is a positive effect between the two variables. Rozeff (1982) concluded in his 
study that, if tax avoidance in dividends is less than complete, the percentage of stock 
held by insiders has a negative relationship with the dividend payout ratio. In the same 
study, this author concluded also that the dividend payout ratio is a negative function of 
the firms’ past and expected future growth rate of sales and a positive function of the 
firm’s number of common stockholders.  
According to Divecha & Morse (1983), an announcement of an increase in dividends 
gives abnormal returns to firms. On the other hand, they defend that firms that both 
increase dividends and have a decrease in payout ratio tend to have higher abnormal 
returns than those that presents an increase in dividends and an increase in payout ratio. 
The idea that the announcement of an increase in dividends gives abnormal returns to 
firms is also shared by Aharony & Swary (1980). Litzenberger & Ramaswamy (1979) 
argued that if a firm reduces (increases) its dividend yield, a lower (higher) expected 
return would be required and consequently the price of the firm’s security increase 
(decrease). Higgins (1972) concluded that the value of the firm is increased when the firm 
adopts a dividend policy that minimizes the costs of excess liquidity and external equity 
financing. Watts (1973) and Gonedes (1978) have shown that dividends do not permit on 
a significant way to anticipate future earnings. 
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Transaction costs are also affected by the dividend policy of the firms. According to 
Bishop et al (2000), some investors prefer low dividend payout because of the transaction 
costs required by the reinvestment of dividends obtained. 
A change in dividend payout ratio has to be preceded by strong motivations to firm’s 
managers. The reasons of the change should be understood by stockholders and the 
financial community. According to Lintner (1956), current net earnings are the best 
variable that helps understanding the change in the rate of dividends, also because it is a 
variable that is frequently presented to public. Management considers that dividends 
should be paid in accordance with earnings, so that when earnings decline, the payment 
of dividends is restricted and shareholders would understand that, Lintner (1956). Lintner 
(1956) concluded that dividends sometimes increase even when there is a decrease in 
profits and when the target ratio has not been already achieved. The contrary also happens 
but it is more unlikely because there is always reluctance in cutting dividends. The 
relationship between the dividend rate observed and the dividend rate forecasted is a more 
relevant variable in determining dividend decisions than the change in profits, Lintner 
(1956). 
Lintner (1956) considers that the most important factors that determine the target payout 
ratio and the factor of adjustment of dividends are: the expected growth of the industry, 
the expected growth and earnings of the company, the average cyclical movement of 
investment opportunities, internal fund flows and working capital needs. Earnings are 
more important as a determinant factor of dividends than, for example, indenture 
provisions, debts to be paid at specific dates, or liquidity positions, Lintner (1956).  
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Lloyd et al (1985) concluded that the larger the firms are, the larger the dividend payout 
ratio. Dhrymes & Kurz (1967) defend that the industry influences the amount of dividends 
paid. Divecha & Morse (1983) have concluded that dividends distribution is a source of 
firms’ information. In a study developed by Lintner (1956), the target payout ratios of the 
companies analyzed was between 20 and 80 percent, in which 50 percent is the most 
common ratio. 
2.5 Main Findings 
In this section, it will be presented a summary of the Literature Review of this dissertation.  
The phenomenon of PPP’s is more and more common. Many countries in the world have 
already adopted PPP’s. Portugal is one of these countries. Some authors defend that in 
PPP’s, the responsibilities (financing, construction, management etc.) are shared between 
the two parties. Inversely, other authors concluded that only the private entity is 
responsible for the financing and management of the project. There exist, also, PPP’s in 
which public entity assumes all the responsibilities. 
The need to provide public services with better quality (and the conclusion that private 
sector has a better performance than public sector) and budget limitations of public sector 
lead to the existence of PPP’s. In terms of PPP characteristics, it was concluded that PPP’s 
involve long term contracts and large investment. Many authors concluded that the factors 
that contribute to the growth in PPP’s are efficiency, integration and accountability. Some 
advantages of PPP’s are economies of scale, rapidity of the construction of 
infrastructures, better quality of the service supplied and the possibility of a better 
allocation of risk. On the other hand, some disadvantages of PPP’s are the possible 
Telma Domingos, Master in Finance 
THE DIVIDEND PAYOUT POLICY IN PROJECT FINANCE: THE CASE OF THE PORTUGUESE 




inadequate allocation of risks, the frequent need to monitor the project because of its 
complexity and the high cost of funding. 
Infrastructures are commonly constructed and exploited by Public Private Partnerships, 
since the construction of infrastructures requires discipline. After the end of the PPP 
period, the facility is transferred from the private entity to the public entity. With their 
advantages and disadvantages, PPP’s are not a consensual topic and induce some 
controversy, namely in what concerns transparency, accountability, efficiency and cost 
effectiveness. 
PPP’s are complex projects. In order to reduce this complexity, it can be created a 
commercial independent entity, named Special Purpose Vehicle. This entity is created to 
only one project, which implies a finite lifetime. Generally, large PPP’s involve SPV’s, 
which imply that infrastructure PPP’s constitute SPV’s. SPV is responsible for the project 
in all of its strands. SPV is owned by the sponsors of the PPP’s and permits to maintain 
the assets and liabilities of the project out of sponsors’ balance sheets, because each 
sponsor has a little percentage of the SPV shares. SPV’s also avoid the possibility of the 
PPP project to be associated with a possible bankruptcy of one of its sponsors. 
SPV’s are project financing; consequently, PPP’s are usually Project Financing. In the 
Project Financing, the question of reinvestment doesn’t exist and there is a fixed dividend 
policy with immediate payout. Inversely, in Corporate Finance, the dividends paid are 
strictly controlled. 
Under imperfect markets, dividends, investment and financing compete for the use of 
internal funds. One of the factors that influence the dividend payout ratio of firms is the 
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agency costs, since dividends can reduce the agency costs. Other explanatory factor is the 
size of the firm. Larger firms present a higher dividends payout ratio. The firms’ past and 
expected future growth rate of sales have a negative relationship with dividend payout 
ratio. On the other hand, dividend payout ratio presents a positive function of the firm’s 
number of common stockholders. The announcement of distribution of dividends leads 
to abnormal returns to the firm. If a firm reduces its dividend yield, the price of the firm’s 
securities increases. Earnings are a strong explanatory variable of dividend payout ratio. 
Indenture provisions, debts to be paid at specific dates and liquidity positions are also 
explanatory variables of dividend yield. 
Chapter 3- Methodology and Data 
In this chapter, it is presented the methodology used in the study and the data collected. 
The objective of this dissertation is to know which of this group of companies presents a 
higher dividend pay-out ratio: road PPP’s in Portugal or Portuguese and Spanish listed 
companies in the sector of construction.  In the Literature Review, it is clear that PPP’s 
have distinctive characteristics comparing with other companies. Literature Review 
permitted to conclude that PPP’s are considered as Project Finance, characterized by only 
one project and absence of reinvestment, which leads to a particular dividends distribution 
policy. Given this deductions, it was formulated a hypothesis of study: 
Dividend payout ratio is higher to the Road PPP’s. 
The variables whose value was collected are “Net Income” and “Total Dividends”. The 
data collected corresponds to years between 2003 and 2011, 9 years in total. 
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The sample (objects of study) is composed by the Portuguese Road PPP’s in exploitation 
in the present, and listed construction firms in Euronext Lisbon and in IBEX 35, 24 
companies in total. Brisa is not included because of the discrepancy of values comparing 
with the other road PPP’s (the levels of Net Profits of Brisa are considerably higher than 
the other PPPs’. Brisa has existed for longer than road PPP’s and is already in “Cruising 
Speed”). Furthermore, other reason for not to include Brisa is the fact that it is a 
concession and not a PPP, which means that it has proper Revenues. The choice of the 
construction firms was motivated by the fact that the construction sector and road PPP’s 
have some common characteristics. Construction firms usually have capital participation 
in road concessions.  
The companies analyzed are the following: 
- PPP’s: Euroscut Algarve, Ascendi Norte, Ascendi Beiras Litoral e Alta, Brisal, Ascendi 
Costa de Prata, Auto-Estradas do Douro Litoral, Euroscut Algarve, Ascendi Grande 
Lisboa, Ascendi Porto, Lusoponte, Norscut Interior Norte and Auto-Estradas Norte. 
- Construction companies: Martifer SGPS SA, Mota Engil SGPS SA, Sacyr 
Vallehermoso SA, Soares da Costa SGPS SA (Portugal) and ACS SA, Arcelormittal, 
FCC SA (Spain). 
Data was collected on the firms’ Annual Reports, on Bloomberg data base, on Amadeus 
data base, CMVM website and CNMV website. After the data is collected, statistical 
analysis were made about the proportion of Dividends in Net Profit to the companies at 
the years referred previously. A comparison was made between the results to PPP’s and 
to construction companies.  
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Chapter 4- The Portuguese Case 
In this chapter, it will be discussed the specific Portuguese case in what concerns PPP’s, 
and more precisely, road PPP’s. 
Portugal is one of the leading countries in the market of PPP’s. (Sarmento & Reis, 2013). 
The beginning of PPP’s in Portugal was in 1993 and road PPP’s were the first type of 
PPP developed in the country (Sarmento & Reis, 2013). According to these authors, in 
the past 15 years the private investment in PPP’s was large (above 17 billion of EUR), 
materialized in 36 PPP’s contracted. In the same way, the financial effort of the 
Government is high, representing per year above 0.5% of the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) until almost 2030, and per year about 1% of the GDP between 2014 and 2020, as 
we can see in Figure 1. Sarmento & Reis (2013) concluded that the Government sees PPP 
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Figure 1. SCUTS Payments 2003-2031 
Unit: Thousands of Euros. 
This figure presents large variations of the amounts of SCUT payments. Between 2003 
and 2006, the payments have a large increase, ranging from around zero to 700 Thousands 
of Euros. These are the years where the Revenues do not exist or are insignificant. For 
this reason, the payments required were very high, and the distribution of Dividends is 
inexistent. From 2007 to 2011, SCUT’s presented higher level of Revenues, and 
consequently positive Profits, which led to a stabilization of the payments and also to the 
existence of distribution of Dividends.  
A recent study of the EIB (European Investment Bank) concluded that Portugal is the 
leader country among the European Countries in what concerns Capital Expenditure in 
PPP projects proportionally to the GDP (Sarmento & Reis, 2013). According to 

































































































Telma Domingos, Master in Finance 
THE DIVIDEND PAYOUT POLICY IN PROJECT FINANCE: THE CASE OF THE PORTUGUESE 




Private Partnerships per capita, even about the double of the same value registered at 
United Kingdom. 
In Portugal, doubts have been raised about the affordability and efficiency of PPP’s, 
according to the trend already verified in other countries. (Sarmento & Reis, 2013). This 
doubts have risen especially in road PPP’s (in the case of Portugal), that brings many 
doubts about Value for Money (VFM) achieved by road concessions. In addition to the 
high level of costs, it is necessary to take in account also the revenues that will come to 
the Government because of PPP’s. However, the forecasts of expected Revenues (traffic) 
have revealed to be optimistic, in terms of Government Revenues (and not private 
Revenues), Sarmento & Reis, 2013. That is one of the reasons why the VFM of these PPP 
projects raise doubts. Other reason is the fact that, in the case of SCUT’s, the risk transfer 
to the private sector was low. Furthermore, the negotiations of SCUT Public Private 
Partnerships was not efficient, there were no public sector comparator (Sarmento, 2010). 
The 2003 audit on Public Private Partnerships, made by the Court of Audit of Portugal 
has concluded that the decision of the use of Public Private Partnerships in the SCUT’s 
(“Sem Custos para o Utilizador”, Without Costs to the User) was not based in any study 
on the efficiency, economy and effectiveness of these PPP’s. In fact, Sarmento (2010) 
concluded in a study that Public Private Partnerships in Portugal, in the conditions that 
they have been processed, do not create Value for Money to the public sector. They 
concluded also that, in this case, the use of traditional procurement would be less 
expensive than the public private partnerships. Sarmento (2010) argue indeed that Public 
Private Partnerships can be more efficient than the traditional procurement, only if they 
Telma Domingos, Master in Finance 
THE DIVIDEND PAYOUT POLICY IN PROJECT FINANCE: THE CASE OF THE PORTUGUESE 




satisfy the condition that the earnings of efficiency exceed the higher cost of finance (due 
to higher interest rates that are required to private entities).   
Sarmento (2010) do not argue that PPP’s are not a good option to make public 
investments; He argues instead that the lack of planning in the Portuguese case of PPP’s 
in the sector of SCUTS was adverse. International publications show that the opinions on 
which the Public Private Partnerships create Value for Money are not consensual.  
The required level of payments that Government has to expend to PPP’s is high. This 
fact, along with the bad political moment in Portugal because of the financial crisis, and 
specifically the intervention of the “Troika”, has required a renegotiation of PPP 
contracts. Following the requirement imposed by the “Troika” to renegotiate the 
contracts, the Government has renegotiated some conditions to reduce and postpone the 
payments. These renegotiations were successful but transferred to the Government more 
risk, ending worse in the long run (Sarmento & Reis, 2013). 
Chapter 5-Statistical Results 
In this chapter, the Descriptive Statistics will be presented through some statistical 
variables that explain Dividend payout of the companies in analysis. First, graphs 
concerning PPP’s are presented and afterwards the graphs of construction companies. 
In Table I, formulated based on the data collected, we observe the Descriptive Statistics 
of the ratio Dividends/ Net Profit (Dividend Payout ratio), to the PPP’s in analysis in 
years between 2003 and 2011. The Mean presents a trend to increase between 2003 and 
2011; in 2003 and 2004 we observe a null Mean, in 2005 24% and in 2011, 37%. The 
Dividend Payout ratio increases in mean 13% between 2005 and 2011. Median is always 
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null, except in 2008 (value: 17%). This means that the Dividend Payout ratio presents 
many observations equal to zero. Standard Deviation, from 2005 to 2011 presents values 
around 40%, which means that observations present some dispersion around the Mean. 
In all years there existed at least one PPP with null Dividend Payout ratio (the Minimum 
is zero in all years). The Maximum reached 1 in 2008 and 2010 and 95% during 5 years.  
As conclusions, we have that in 2003 and 2004 dividend payout ratio was zero to all 
PPP’s. Dividend payout ratio increased between 2005 and 2011. From 2007 onwards, a 
significant part of PPP’s have distributed almost 100% of their Net Profits, because of the 
existence of Revenues from the referred year. However, there are some PPP’s that make 
the Mean to be lower than 50% in all years. As it will be shown in Table 2, PPP’s that are 
not SCUT’s (Oeste, Norte, Douro Litoral, Grande Lisboa, Lusoponte and Brisal) 
distributed a lower level of dividends. All of them, except Lusoponte, present a Mean of 
0%.  
Table I. Dividends/Net Profit of PPP’s – Analysis by year (2003-2011) 
Source: Figure formulated based on the data collected 
Note: The number of observations varies year to year because there are years in which do 
not exist data to some PPP because of its posterior creation and also because in some 
situations the Net Profit was null.  
Year Mean Median Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum N
2003 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 9
2004 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 9
2005 24% 0% 41% 0% 95% 9
2006 28% 0% 46% 0% 95% 10
2007 31% 0% 43% 0% 95% 11
2008 38% 17% 46% 0% 100% 12
2009 23% 0% 38% 0% 95% 13
2010 42% 0% 47% 0% 100% 13
2011 37% 0% 44% 0% 95% 13
Telma Domingos, Master in Finance 
THE DIVIDEND PAYOUT POLICY IN PROJECT FINANCE: THE CASE OF THE PORTUGUESE 




In Table II, formulated based on the data collected, we observe the Descriptive Statistics 
of the ratio Dividends/ Net Profit (Dividend Payout ratio), to the PPP’s in analysis in 
years between 2003 and 2011. This is an analysis by PPP. To the PPP’s which Mean is 
not zero, the Mean of the Dividend Payout Ratio varies between 30% (Beira Litoral e 
Alta) and 72% (Beira Interior). To six PPP’s, the Mean is null. Median varies between 
zero and 95%. Standard Deviation is zero to the PPP’s that has Mean equal to zero; to the 
other PPP’s, the Standard Deviation varies from 37% and 50%, which means that 
observations present some dispersion around the Mean. To all PPP’s, the Minimum 
Dividend Payout ratio observed is zero. The Maximum is zero to the same PPP’s which 
Mean is zero and reached 1 in Norte Litoral and Beira Litoral e Alta, 87% at Costa de 
Prata and 95% at Algarve, Grande Porto, Beira Interior and Lusoponte. 
Table II. Dividends/Net Profit of PPP’s – Analysis by PPP (2003-2011) 
Source: Figure formulated based on the data collected 
Note: The number of observations varies year to year because there are years in which do 
not exist data to some PPP because of its posterior creation and also because in some 
situations the Net Profit was null.  
PPP Mean Median Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum N
Algarve 42% 0% 50% 0% 95% 9
Oeste 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 9
Norte Litoral 40% 21% 48% 0% 100% 6
Norte 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 9
Beiras Litoral e Alta 30% 0% 41% 0% 100% 9
Costa de Prata 33% 16% 37% 0% 87% 9
Douro Litoral 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 4
Grande Lisboa 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 3
Grande Porto 31% 0% 47% 0% 95% 9
Interior Norte 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 9
Beira Interior 72% 95% 41% 0% 95% 9
Lusoponte 60% 81% 41% 0% 95% 9
Brisal 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 5
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In Table III, formulated based on the data collected, we observe the Descriptive Statistics 
of the ratio Dividends/ Net Profit (Dividend Payout Ratio), to the construction companies 
in analysis in years between 2003 and 2011. The Mean of the Dividend Payout Ratio 
varies between 13%, in 2010, and 70% (2004 and 2005). Median of Dividend Payout 
Ratio presents values between 11% and 87%. Standard Deviation, from 2003 and 2011 
presents values between 13% and 42%, which means that observations present some 
dispersion around the Mean. In almost all years existed at least one company with null 
Dividend Payout (The Minimum is zero in all years, except 2009). The Maximum is 
100% in 2003-2006 and in 2009 and 2011, 96% in 2007, 93% in 2008 and 38% in 2010, 
which means that in almost all years, at least one construction company distributed all its 
Net Profits in the form of dividends.  
The construction companies that most contributes to the high Means are ACS SA, Sacyr 
Vallehermoso SA, FCC SA and Mota Engil SGPS SA. A particular note that we can refer 
is that in 2009 and 2010 the Mean of Dividend Payout Ratio was lower because of the 
financial crisis. 
Comparing with the correspondent table of PPP’s (table 1), it can be concluded that Mean 
by year is, in general terms, higher to construction companies than to PPP’s. The Median 
is also higher to the construction companies than to PPP’s. The Standard Deviation is 
similar to PPP’s and construction companies. In terms of Maximum, the values are similar 
to PPP’s and construction companies. Both types of organization present Maximum of 
100% in some years. PPP’s present some Maximum values of 0%, but for construction 
companies this doesn’t happen. 
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Table III. Dividends/Net Profit of Construction Companies – Analysis by year 
(2003-2011) 
Source: Figure formulated based on the data collected 
Note: The number of observations varies year to year because there are years in which do 
not exist data to some company because of its posterior creation. 
In Table IV, formulated based on the data collected, we observe the Descriptive Statistics 
of the ratio Dividends/ Net Profit (Dividend Payout Ratio), to the construction companies 
in analysis in years between 2003 and 2011. The Mean of the Dividend Payout Ratio 
varies between 1% (Martifer SGPS SA) and 73% (ACS SA). Median varies between zero 
and 87%. Standard Deviation presents low values, which means that observations present 
low dispersion around the Mean. The Minimum Dividend Payout ratio varies between 
zero and 34%. The Maximum reached 100% in three companies. In terms of conclusions, 
the Mean observed is in general higher to construction companies than to PPP’s. 
Concerning Standard Deviation, the situation is similar to PPP’s and to construction 
companies. Unlike PPP’s, in which Minimum is always zero, to construction companies 
Minimum varies between 0% and 34%. The years that most contributed to high levels of 
dividends are from 2003 to 2006. 
Year Mean Median Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum N
2003 56% 61% 36% 0% 100% 5
2004 70% 87% 40% 0% 100% 5
2005 70% 77% 41% 0% 100% 5
2006 54% 74% 42% 0% 100% 6
2007 43% 28% 40% 0% 96% 7
2008 39% 32% 39% 0% 93% 7
2009 36% 34% 31% 8% 100% 7
2010 13% 11% 13% 0% 38% 7
2011 52% 63% 42% 0% 100% 7
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Table IV. Dividends/Net Profit of Construction Companies – Analysis by company 
(2003-2011) 
Source: Figure formulated based on the data collected 
Note: The number of observations varies year to year because there are years in which do 
not exist data to some company because of its posterior creation. 
The tables presented shows different characteristics of PPP’s and construction companies, 
in what concerns Dividend Payout ratio. It was made an interrelation between the analysis 
by year and by PPP/construction company. This helped to understand the values obtained. 
Some explanations to the values were presented. In the following chapter, it will be 







Company Mean Median Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum N
Martifer SGPS SA 1% 0% 3% 0% 8% 6
Mota Engil SGPS SA 56% 57% 24% 20% 93% 9
Sacyr Vallehermoso SA 63% 87% 45% 0% 100% 9
Soares da Costa SGPS SA 8% 0% 13% 0% 32% 9
ACS SA 73% 73% 25% 34% 100% 9
Arcelormittal 46% 32% 43% 6% 100% 6
FCC SA 62% 72% 29% 11% 91% 9
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Chapter 6- Results 
6.1 Results 
The objective of the study is to conclude if PPP’s distribute a higher level of Dividend 
Payout Ratio than construction companies.  
Figure 2. Dividends/ Net Profit of PPP’s – Analysis by PPP (2003-2011) 
Source: Figure formulated based on the data collected 
As we can see in Figure 2 (formulated based on the data collected) in the years in analysis, 
PPP’s of Oeste, Norte, Douro Litoral, Grande Lisboa, Interior Norte and Brisal have not 
distributed any dividends. This is explained by the fact that in this period, the Net Profit 
to all of this PPP’s was negative or null in most of years. In some cases, this is due to the 
beginning of this PPP’s few years ago, time not sufficient to have positive Net Profits. 
This is the case of Douro Litoral and Grande Lisboa, which began its activity in 2007. 
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Beira Interior, Grande Porto and Costa de Prata), that only presented dividends from 2007 
onwards, are examples of PPP’s that did not present a high level of Dividend Payout 
Ratio. Beira Interior and Lusoponte were the PPP’s with the higher frequency in 
dividends distribution: they distributed dividends between 2005 and 2011. 
 
Figure 3. Dividends/ Net Profit of PPP’s – Analysis by year (2003-2011) 
Source: Figure formulated based on the data collected 
The main conclusion on figure 3 (formulated based on the data collected) is that between 
2003 and 2011, the number of PPP’s that distributed dividends has gradually increased. 
In 2003 and 2004, none of the 12 PPP’s in the graph distributed dividends. The years in 
which a larger number of PPP’s has distributed dividends were 2010 and 2011: in these 
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some PPP’s began to distribute the total amount of its net profits, which means a Dividend 
Payout Ratio of 100% (Norte Litoral in 2008 and Beiras Litoral e Alta in 2010). 
Figure 4. Total Dividends/ Total Net Profits of PPP’s (2003-2011) 
Source: Figure formulated based on the data collected 
According to Figure 4 (formulated based on the data collected), Beira Interior and Grande 
Porto have distributed more than 90% of their total Net Profits in the period in analysis 
(around 93% and 92% respectively). Lusoponte and Costa de Prata paid dividends around 
71%, Beiras Litoral e Alta 69%, Norte Litoral and Algarve 57%. In fact, each one of the 
PPP’s that distributed dividends have distributed in total more than half of the Total Net 
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Figure 5. Dividends/ Net Profits of construction companies- Analysis by company 
(2003-2011) 
Source: Figure formulated based on the data collected 
According to Figure 5 (formulated based on the data collected), Martifer distributed 
dividends only in 2009. Except Martifer, 4 was the minimum number of years in which 
Construction Companies distributed dividends. Mota Engil, ACS and FCC distributed 
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Source: Figure formulated based on the data collected 
According to Figure 6 (formulated based on the data collected), 2003, 2004 and 2005 
were the years in which the number of companies that distributed dividends was lower: 
only three companies per year. However, in the following years, this number increased. 
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Figure 7. Total Dividends/ Total Net Profits of construction companies (2003-2011) 
Source: Figure formulated based on the data collected 
As we see in Figure 7 (formulated based on the data collected), ACS has a dividend 
payout ratio of 75%, Sacyr 67% and FCC 64%. Mota Engil has a dividend payout ratio 
significantly lower, 44%. In the group of the lower dividend payout ratio, we find Soares 
da Costa, Arcellormittal and Martifer (25%, 19% and 15%, respectively). 
6.2 Comparing Results for PPP’s and Construction Companies 
According to the Literature Review, PPP’s and construction companies are different in 
several points. The fact that PPP’s are based in Project Finance distinguishes them from 
common companies, namely in terms of application of Net Profits. Then, and according 
to expected, the results obtained to PPP’s and to construction companies are different. 
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Six PPP’s (Oeste, Norte, Douro Litoral, Grande Lisboa, Interior Norte and Brisal) have 
not distributed any dividends in any years between 2003-2011, while in construction 
companies, all of them distributed dividends in some years. This can be explained by the 
fact that many PPP’s had negative Net Profits in some years, because of the beginning of 
its activity in recent years, especially SCUT’s, in which Revenues began to exist only in 
2007. In Figure 3, we concluded that in 2003 and 2004 no PPP distributed any dividends. 
In what concerns PPP’s, to all of them that distributed dividends, the dividend payout 
ratio was equal or above 57%. Inversely, to the Construction Companies, four of them 
presented a dividend payout ratio equal or lower than 44%.  
Although the mean of the dividend payout ratio is higher to the Construction companies 
than to the PPP’s, this is due to the fact that a considerable number of PPP’s did not 
distribute dividends (because of negative Net Profits). In PPP’s, the distribution of 
dividends have increased in the period in analysis. Inversely, in construction companies, 
the distribution of dividends tends to be constant (except in 2009-2011, because of the 
financial crisis). 
 
Chapter 7 – Conclusions and Future Investigation 
In this section, it will be presented the conclusion of this dissertation and the suggestions 
to future investigation on this topic. The Research Question of this dissertation 
(formulated according to the Literature Review) is: Dividend Payout is higher to PPP’s 
than to construction companies? The objective is then to find the response to this question. 
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In aggregated terms (dividing the total dividends distributed by all PPP’s in the period in 
analysis by the total net profits obtained by all PPP’s in the period in analysis, and doing 
the same to construction companies), we obtain a percentage of 64% to PPP’s and 24% 
for construction companies. This means that during these 9 years PPP’s have distributed 
64% of their total Net Profits, and construction companies have distributed 24% of their 
total Net Profits. We can conclude then that in years 2003-2011 the Dividend Payout 
Ratio is significantly higher to PPP’s than to construction companies. It is important to 
refer that these percentages were computed considering Dividends and correspondent Net 
Profits only to years in which existed Positive Net Profits. 
The conclusion referred in the previous paragraph is explained by the Literature Review: 
the fact that PPP’s are considered Project Finance (PPP’s have only one project with a 
finite lifetime), which implies that the need to reinvest is low, and consequently the Net 
Profits are generally available to pay dividends to shareholders. Inversely, construction 
companies are included in Corporate Finance, and need to reinvest; consequently, they 
use their Net Profits to invest, which reduces the amount of Net Profits available to 
distribute dividends.  
PPP’s are characterized by its contractual clauses. Some of these clauses can be related 
to dividend payout, which means that contractual clauses are also possible explanatory 
variables of the conclusion reached in this dissertation. 
After 2007, most PPP’s presented a dividend payout ratio of almost 100%. This fact has 
two explanations. The first is that from 2007, SCUT payments reached about 700 Million 
of Euros, and this level of payments is expected to maintain stable during about 20 years 
of the concessions. The second explanation is related with the first one. Revenues 
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generally follows a set of priorities in what concerns allocation of resources: first, 
Revenues are used to pay Operating and maintenance costs, second, they are used to pay 
costs with Tax, third, Revenues pay costs with debt (debt service and debt interest), fourth 
Revenues serve to pay shareholders returns – dividends. From 2007, with the maintenance 
of costs, that precede distribution of dividends, the level of dividends paid was expected 
to increase. 
All PPP’s that distributed dividends presented a Dividend Payout ratio equal or above 
57% during the entire period. Inversely, in Construction Companies, four of them 
presented a dividend payout ratio equal or lower than 44% during all period. Individually, 
which means by PPP or by year, although the mean of the dividend payout ratio is higher 
to the Construction companies than to the PPP’s, this is due to the fact that a considerable 
number of PPP’s didn’t distributed dividends (because of the negative Net Profits caused 
by its recent existence, namely the SCUT’s that began to have Revenues in 2007).  
According to these facts, the hypothesis defined to this study is proved to be true: We can 
conclude that Dividend Payout ratio is higher to the Road PPP’s than to the construction 
companies. 
In what concerns the limitations of the study, the number of years used in the study is low 
and presents the disadvantage that, in the case of PPP’s, some of the years present a low 
level of Revenues. The second limitation is the low number of companies in analysis.  
In what concerns future research, we suggest that, in a few years, a study similar to this 
to be made, in order to reduce the effect of the first years of PPP’s life. Maintaining the 
number of years in study (9 years), but beginning at 2007 would allow to eliminate the 
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null dividends observed in 2003-2006 in some PPP’s (which was due to the fact that, in 
most cases, the majority of PPP’s presented negative net profits, because of its 
implementation few years ago). We suggest also the realization of studies about this issue 
including a higher number of companies and PPP’s, PPP’s of other sectors and also PPP’s 
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